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Abstract
The potential national security effect of foreign acquisitions has
been a long standing issue facing the host states worldwide,
which holds particular true between those adversary nations,
like the United States and China. Such unexpected conse-
quences as plausible protectionism and governance discrimina-
tion are detrimental to the global economic recovery. The cre-
ation of China’s own national security review (NSR) regime
complicates further the perceived retaliatory measures. To
pierce the veil of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States’ (CFIUS) process of NSR is conducive to miti-
gating unnecessary stalemate between the two world economic
giants in the scenarios of cross-border investments. Ralls serves
as a landmark case for a Chinese company to challenge the US
President’s and CFIUS’s divesture orders. It remains uncertain
of the extent to which the CFIUS’s future NSR assessment pro-
cedures will be reshaped followed by the US executive’s setback
in the lawsuit. Through maintaining a predictable regulatory
landscape, it is crucial to strike a balance between encouraging
foreign investment and protecting national security.
Introduction
Globalisation provides China with financial capital and
advanced technologies to expand its geopolitical clout as well as
overseas commercial accesses.1 Merger and acquisitions (M&As)
are the predominant form of entry of foreign direct interment
(FDI) worldwide. Chinese multinational companies (MNCs),
some of which are state-owned enterprises/national champions,
attempt to acquire American firms that deal with strategic assets
or critical infrastructures.2 Sany Electric is a China-based global
manufacturing company to produce wind turbines. Ralls, a
Delaware company owned by two Chinese nationals who are
also senior executives of Sany, sought to acquire four wind farm
projects in Oregon. The assets are near restricted Navy airspace.
Ralls was ordered by the US President to disinvest its acquisition
of the target projects. It then filed suit, alleging that the Presi-
dent has exceeded his authority under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.3 Although the grounds of the Appeal of Court’s
reversal are narrow, the decision represents a sharp rebuke to the
opaque procedures used to conduct national security review
(NSR) of foreign investments in the US. There is a particularly
notable lack of consensus on how to treat transnational M&As
that raise questions of national security. It remains challengeable
to balance two plausible values, ie, promoting an open market
and protecting national security.4 The paper takes a comparative
look at the enforcement agencies’ review of foreign M&As on
the ground of national security.
The paper proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the
CFIUS, which is designed to scrutinise the national security
implications that might emerge from foreign takeovers of US
firms.5 The current mechanism leaves the CFIUS and Presi-
dent’s interpretation of the NSR unchallenged prior to the case
of Ralls. Part II looks into Ralls’ argument that the President
exceeded his statutory authority by ordering the plaintiff to
unwind its operation in Oregon, and that it was deprived of due
process. The court did not challenge the national security mer-
its of the President’s decision, but rather the way in which he
implemented it. Part III addresses challenges Ralls poses to the
national security through a depoliticised regulatory process,
with a particular focus on national critical infrastructure
(NCI). A rigorous analysis about the perceived discrimination
based on nationalities is developed in this part. It is concerned
that acquisitions by companies from China are receiving more
intense scrutiny than acquisitions by those from its close allies.6
The rules and regulations should be transparent, consistent and
applied equally, regardless of where foreign investors are from.
Part IV discusses implication arising from the US paradoxical
protections measures, which may deter foreign investment and
precipitate retaliation. Part V sets forth some suggestions high-
lighting that an efficient compliance governance represents a
most practical resolution to the status quo of the stalemate.
The voluntary filling to CFIUS is highly advocated, due largely
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to the fact that any failure to do so remains subject indefinitely
to divestment or other sanctions. A tentative conclusion is pro-
vided in the final part, reaffirming that it is vital to strike a bal-
ance to safeguard national security without stifling free trade
and innovation. 
A. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS)
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) is an inter-agency group charged with reviewing
whether a proposed foreign acquisition would compromise US
national security.7 Its scrutiny encompasses not only defence sec-
tors and dual-use technologies, but also critical infrastructure.
Furthermore, the Act grants the President authority to block
mergers, acquisitions or takeovers involving foreign entities if
they threaten to impair national security.8 The President acts
only after reviewing the record compiled by CFIUS.9 Such a
practice is plausibly driven by the statute, which expressly
exempts the President’s determination from judicial review. 
1. The establishment of the CFIUS under the Exon-Florio
Amendment
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) was established under the Defence Production Act of
1950, also known as the ‘Exon-Florio Amendment’.10 The
CFIUS vets foreign takeovers of US assets, which is tasked with
reviewing foreign nationals’ acquisitions to determine whether
the transactions would affect US national security.11 Congress
granted CFIUS the authority to ‘negotiate, enter into or impose,
and enforce any agreement or condition’ in order to mitigate
any threat to the national security that arises as a result of the
covered transaction.12 After notification, the CFIUS has 30 days
to conduct an initial review, and if it deems that a statutory
investigation is necessary, it has another 45 days to investigate,
after which it decides to either permit the acquisition or recom-
mend the President to block the transaction.13 In accordance
with Exon-Florio, the President delegates his authority to review
such transactions to the CFIUS.14 Only if CFIUS determines
that the measure did not mitigate the threat does the President
have an opportunity to act.15 If recommended for prohibition,
the President has another 15 days to make a final decision.16
Such action is considered as a last resort, only enforceable after
the President has concluded that no other alternative remedies
are adequate to protect national security. 
CFIUS was significantly amended by the Foreign Investment
and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), which increases
congressional oversight, broadens the scope of factors for
CFIUS to consider, and formalises CFIUS’s practice of negoti-
ating remedies with the parties.17 The statute contains a finality
provision which states: 
‘[t]he actions of the President under paragraph (1) of subsec-
tion (d) of this section and the findings of the President under
paragraph (4) of subsection (d) of this section shall not be sub-
ject to judicial review.’18
Only once did the President actually invoke his authority to
block a transaction.19 In practice, a significant portion of CFIUS
activity is conducted through informal mechanisms, where the
transacting parties engage in discussions with the CFIUS even
before the formal 30-day review period and often modify terms
to obtain clearance. If modification is unviable, parties normally
withdraw a deal.20
2. The widened definition of national security 
The term ‘national security’ is not defined in the statute and is
construed broadly by CFIUS to include all facts and circum-
stances that have potential national security implications. There
remains no clear indication of when a foreign acquisition con-
stitutes a national security threat and what sort of transactions
are likely to be rejected on national security grounds. The term
national security is interpreted broadly for purpose of Exon-Flo-
rio review. CFIUS has explicitly rejected the concept of ‘eco-
nomic security’ in the definition of national security, although as
a practical matter CFIUS does consider economic issues if they
affect national security.21 FINSA has significantly broadened the
US’s definition to include many sectors of the economy previ-
ously beyond CFIUS’s purview. Notably, it seems that FINSA
still deliberately avoids referring to ‘national economic securi-
ty.’22 The changes in law make it evident that the definition of
national security has substantively expanded with the effects of
FINSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s
presence broadening CFIUS’s mandate.23 It is worth examining
whether CFIUS is equipped adequately to take measures to mit-
igate that risk, or even block the investment in case of any
national security issues.24
B. Ralls Corp v Barack H Obama, et al
In March 2012, Ralls, an Oregon corporation owned by two
Chinese nationals who also hold senior management positions
within the Sany Group China (Sany), acquired interests in four
wind farm project companies from Terna Energy USA Holding
Corporation (Terna). The wind farms are all within or in the
vicinity of restricted air space at Naval Weapons Systems Train-
ing Facility Boardman in Oregon.25 Companies involved in
transactions likely to be reviewed can file a voluntary notice
seeking review under the Act.26 However, Ralls neither volun-
tarily notified CFIUS of the transaction not sought its approval
prior to closing their deal. Before the end of the first 30-day
review, CFIUS determined that there existed credible evidence
to show the transaction posed national security risks on the crit-
ical infrastructure.27 Ralls was then given 90 days to divest all
interest and 14 days to remove all facilities from the sites. The
President, recommended by CFIUS,28 issued an order to divest
Ralls’ ownership in the target project on 28 September 2012.29
The Order was based on account of ‘credible evidence’ indicat-
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ing that the parties, ‘through exercising control of the [compa-
nies,] might take action that threatens to impair the national
security of the United States.’30 The decision reaffirms the Pres-
ident’s broad authority under the Exon-Florio Amendment to
block foreign acquisitions on the basis of national security con-
cerns. Arguably, neither CFIUS nor the President gave Ralls
notice of the evidence on which they relied in issuing their
orders, nor any opportunity to rebut that evidence.31 The core
issues before the court to determine whether the presidential
actions on national security grounds shall be subject to judicial
review, and whether the restriction should extend to constitu-
tional issues raised by CFIUS transactions.
1. The landmark lawsuit against the CFIUS and the 
President of the United States 
Ralls took an unprecedented step to challenge the authority of
the CFIUS and the President for thwarting the acquisition on
12 September 2012.32 It alleged that the presidential and CFIUS
had violated the Exon-Florio Amendment and the Administra-
tive Procedures Act (APA), and it was an unconstitutional tak-
ing of property without due process of law.33 The action was
before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The US District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia found that Ralls had no protected property
interest in the four wind farm project companies because it had
acquired the companies subject to the known risk of divestiture
under the President’s CFIUS authority.34 The District Court
also determined that Ralls’ ability to interact with CFIUS was
sufficient due process for the sake of the protecting the national
security.35 On 26 February 2013, the court declined to review
the President’s findings on the merits, and dismissed Ralls’
claims of violations of the Exon-Florio Amendment and the
APA as beyond the scope of judicial review.36
The President is traditionally given wide latitude to decide
matters related to national security. He has the authority to
review and block an investment if ‘there is credible evidence that
leads the President to believe ... [the investment] threatens to
impair the national security.’37 The President’s exercise of his
discretion that Congress has left to his sole discretion is unre-
viewable by the courts, particularly in matters of national securi-
ty.38 Judicial review of this claim would deprive Congress’ finali-
ty clause of its true effect.39 In response to Ralls’s request for a
right to judicial review, it is ascertained that the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) does not confer jurisdiction on Article III
courts to review actions of the President.40 Apparently, the Pres-
idential Order aimed to strengthen the government’s hand in
conducting foreign investment policy and mitigate any potential
threat to the national security.41 It is not within the role of the
courts to second-guess executive judgments made in furtherance
of the branch’s role.42 It remains final and cannot be overturned
by the courts.43 As such, the court has been traditionally reluc-
tant to exercise judicial review when a plaintiff seeks an order of
the court that will bear directly on the President.44 It can be
argued that the court has narrowly construed the circumstances
under which a challenge to presidential action will be found
unreviewable,45 that is, the findings of the President shall not be
subject to judicial review.46
2. Appeal: unconstitutional deprivation of property 
without due process
Given the setback, Ralls has brought a due process claim that
raises purely legal questions about the process that was followed
in implementing the statute. On 7 February 2014, Ralls filed an
appeal of the DC Circuit Court’s ruling that:
‘Count IV alleges that the CFIUS Order and the Presidential
Order violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution as unconstitutional depriva-
tions of property without due process of law.’47
The DC Circuit disagreed with the lower court and held that
Ralls’ vested property interest could not be deprived without
first notifying Ralls of the official action, providing Ralls access
to the unclassified evidence on which the President relied, and
affording Ralls an opportunity to rebut that evidence.48 On 15
July 2014, the court found that President Obama’s
order deprived Ralls of its right to due process under the law,49
and reversed the District Court decision. Due to the procedural
defects, it was held that due process required ‘at the least’ that
the parties be afforded:
‘(1) notice of the official action;
(2) access to the unclassified information “on which the offi-
cial actor relied,”; and
(3) an opportunity to rebut that evidence.’50
The President does have an unreviewable right ‘to suspend or
prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the
national security of the United States’, nevertheless, it does not
preclude ‘the reviewability of a constitutional claim challenging
the process preceding such presidential action.’51 The due
process clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall be ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.’52 The court has not ruled on the
merits of this challenge, but simply found that it has jurisdiction
to hear this claim that the Presidential Order deprives it of prop-
erty without due process of law.53 Thus, the court confirmed
that it has jurisdiction to determine whether the President has
followed proper procedures in exercising the discretion. The
Court of Appeals has remanded the case back to DC District
Court, with instructions that Ralls be provided adequate due
process, as well as an opportunity to rebut such information. It
was also notable that the US government can appeal this deci-
sion to the Supreme Court of the United States.54
Despite Ralls’ due process claim, an inherent difficulty is the
fact that CFIUS’s risk assessment for any particular transaction is
based on classified information that is generally not susceptible to
public disclosure.55 The executive branch is legitimately obliged
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to reveal only unclassified information used to block the acquisi-
tion. Certain ‘capability’ and ‘intent’ assessment of transactions
are completed by the nonvoting intelligence agencies, like the
National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).56 The legal mandate is reinforced by the determi-
nation of the US intelligence agencies to keep their assessments
secret so as not to reveal ‘sources and methods’ used in their
investigations.57 Therefore, the President shall not be permitted
to divulge the evidence and reasoning on which his divestiture
order was based. The secrecy is essential to protect the national
security interests, but it would risk devolving into unprincipled
protectionism.58 Between valuable investment and security inter-
ests, it is hard to neutralise one value over another, which raises a
question of the extent to which how the NSR mechanism is to be
transparent and subject to public scrutiny. It remains uncertain
how the President could provide to Ralls to explain his decision
in light of the classified nature of the CFIUS process.59 The Ralls
case entails the judiciary to develop jurisprudence on a funda-
mental question, that is, how much due process should be owed
to foreign acquirers undergoing CFIUS reviews.60
C. The Ralls’ far-reaching repercussions
The case of Ralls to challenge the CFIUS process in court may
have raised a legitimate question about how CFIUS operates. It
was the first time that a President invoked his authority to block
an investment under Section 721 of Defence Production Act of
1950 in nearly 25 years.61 It was also the first time where the judi-
ciary was called upon to resolve the administrative dispute.62 The
ruling represents a plausible win for Ralls that confronted the
CFIUS’s national security concerns. The case shows how essen-
tial it is to notify CFIUS voluntarily prior to an acquisition.
Had Ralls done so, it might have been possible to work out some
mitigation arrangement that would have allowed at least some
part of the transaction to go through. 
1. The interpretation of national critical infrastructure (NCI)
There must be effective procedures in place to assess risks aris-
ing from potential investment in the critical national infra-
structure (CNI). The focus on protection of CNI is an evolving
national security objective, and may have different implications
in various regulatory contexts.63 Intrinsically, allowing more
than one agencies to apply their own definitions ensures that a
broad ranges of interests are represented, weighed and balanced
as part of the integral review process.64 FINSA defines the term
as ‘systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
or assets would have a debilitating impact on national securi-
ty’.65 However, the statutory definition used by DHS is ‘systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any com-
bination of those matters.’66 It can be seen that the two defini-
tions do not match exactly each other, which are subject to the
enforcement agencies’ interpretation and discretion. Although
FINSA includes NCI in the definition of national security, the
CFIUS regulations specifically reject defining classes of systems
or assets as ‘critical infrastructure.’67 CFIUS’s mandate does not
include national economic security, which is significantly nar-
rower than DHS’s focus and vague in its application. CFIUS
has the power to determine the effects of the transaction on the
US national security.68
The American government is particularly concerned about
protecting the US defence apparatus from espionage. The prox-
imity of the Oregon Projects to a US Naval Weapons System
Training Facility was likely a significant factor in the CFIUS
assessment. It reviews particularly those investments that
involve facilities in proximity to sensitive installations. CFIUS
had effectively blocked a previous transaction in which a Chi-
nese state-controlled firm sought to acquire a gold mine near
military assets.69 Due to the proximity of the target project to the
military installation, CFIUS found that the transaction at issue
might threaten to impair the national security. On the one
hand, the flexibility of the language is critical to the CFIUS’s
proper functioning. On the other hand, the lack of a specific,
limited definition of ‘national security’ arguably subjects foreign
investments to an arbitrary and capricious review process.70
2. The perceived nationality discrimination
The broad definition of national security may enable the CFIUS
to politicise foreign investment by disfavouring countries, such
as China, which might represent a threat to US economic hege-
mony.71 The prospective purchaser’s nationality and whether it
is controlled by a foreign government are important factors in
determining whether a CFIUS review is necessary. Some com-
panies are scrutinised more than others by virtue of their nation-
ality, which may influence the CFIUS process.72 Transactions
involving Chinese acquirers perceived as non-alliance are likely
subject to greater scrutiny than those within its alliance, such as
the EU. Notably, there are other wind farms owned by foreign
companies in the proximity of the airbase, but Ralls’s wind farms
were singled out. It is perceived that companies from countries
that have weak corporate governance or have a history of espi-
onage will be subject to higher scrutiny.73 CFIUS seems to be
more suspicious of some ostensibly private Chinese firms as
insufficiently distinct from those owned or controlled by the
Chinese government. This normally result in heightened scruti-
ny of national champions irrespective of whether they are offi-
cially state owned enterprises (SOEs).74
The plausible discrimination could lead to retaliatory mea-
sures to the detriment of American investors attempting to
enter into the Chinese markets.75 Nevertheless, an empirical
analysis of public data for discriminatory application has proved
to the contrary that no evidence indicates that the NSR is being
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undertaken in a discriminatory manner.76 This can be used to
rebut the perceived country-based discrimination for which
China may establish in retaliation to the detriment of US
investors. Indirectly, the empirical data serves as a solid coun-
terevidence in refuting that CFIUS impedes trade liberalisation
in an arbitrary and capricious manner. It seems that CFIUS was
not so much concerned about foreign ownership of wind farm
assets, but rather the installation of Ralls’s project so close to
military assets.77 The facts of the case provide valuable insight in
the CFIUS review process and lessons for Chinese companies
seeking to invest in assets geographically near sensitive defence
instalments.78 In a world of geopolitical tensions, acquisitions by
firms from potential adversary countries, like China, will
inevitably receive disproportionately intense scrutiny.79 Given
the political sensitivity surrounding inbound investment, for
the foreseeable future, Chinese investment in strategic Ameri-
can sectors will continue to be scrutinised.80 A Chinese compa-
ny may have to go further than the law would seem to require. 
3. The far-reaching implications 
The case of Ralls will have substantial impact on foreign com-
panies’ M&As in certain sensitive industry sectors, which could
also reshape long-standing procedures at CFIUS. It is consid-
ered a milestone since the court has held that the parties before
CFIUS are entitled to procedural due process. The decision
could give foreign firms more leverage and greater legal protec-
tions as they seek to expand in the US, which may open the
door to potential legal challenge provided that parties are
denied due process. As a setback for the CFIUS,81 the landmark
decision arguably weakened the President’s ability to block for-
eign firms’ acquisition on national security grounds.82 The rul-
ing will help create some transparency in the CFIUS process,
which may facilitate the prospect of a more transparent process.
Ralls’ unprecedented legal victory over the CFIUS could shake
up the secretive government review process that weighs the
national security implications of foreign acquisitions in the US.
Prior to the Ralls case, foreign companies have had virtually no
say in the review process, but the ruling could result in requir-
ing the CFIUS disclose the unclassified evidence upon which it
relies in making decisions.83 In addition, the challenge may
increase the burdens on parties and result in lengthier and more
rigorous investigations. Furthermore, under any scenario  the
authority of CFIUS to review acquisitions remains intact, its
ability to call in unfiled transactions remains undisturbed. Last
but not the least, another point worthy to note is the divesture
order may precipitate a possible tit-for-tat retaliation from the
CFIUS’s counterpart. In 2011 China established its own
national security review regime that mirrors the operation of
CFIUS. Given the de facto discriminatory consequences arising
from such precedents as Huawei and Ralls, it is worth exploring
whether the Chinese NSR regime could politicise potential
American businesses in China. 
D. The National Security Review regimes 
in China
There has been a trend of heightened scrutiny of foreign invest-
ment into China in potentially sensitive sectors. If a transaction
is determined to pose a significant concern to national security,
parties may be required either to withdraw the transaction or to
implement the mandatory remedies to address the concern.
With increase in acquisitions of Chinese domestic companies by
foreign investors, China has set up its own equivalent to US’
CFIUS. Some concerns arise as to whether the US Congres-
sional action to tighten restrictions on foreign investment in the
US has provoked similar countermeasures in China, arguably
limiting opportunities for outward investment by American
companies. Even it remains uncertain whether national security
could be used as a pretext for protectionism. It is worth focusing
on the extent to which the Chinese NSR process is similar to, or
distinct from the CFIUS.
1. The National Security Review (NSR) framework 
The definition of national security has substantial impact on
which cross-border mergers receive clearance, which concep-
tion impacts the legal regime surrounding the NSR review.
Both the US and China use a deliberately open-ended defini-
tion of national security in both regulatory regimes.84 Given the
lack of sufficient parameters, a further effort needs to be made
to circumscribe as clearly as possible what the concepts of
national security means to avoid possible protectionist or dis-
crimination. This new definition under FINSA makes the US
practice more likely to appeal to Chinese Antimonopoly
Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs), which is likely to influence
the emerging Chinese NSR committee. China defines ‘nation-
al security’ much more broadly than does the definition used in
CFIUS review. For instance, defence and high-technology
industries are not the only sectors that potentially fall under the
national security arena. 
The Antimonopoly Law (AML 2008) provides for a separate
review under a circumstance where foreigners’ proposed trans-
action will have any adverse effect on nation security, in addi-
tion to the anti-monopoly review.85 The statute paves the way
for legitimate establishment of a framework for an NSR
regime.86 Under the supervision of the State Council institu-
tionally, the NSR is conducted by a joint inter-ministerial com-
mittee (NSR Committee) led by MOFCOM. The NSR Com-
mittee is empowered to ensure that there are effective institu-
tions in place, and clear lines of responsibility. It normally
undertakes sophisticated assessment based on the following ele-
ments, among other things, national defence, national econom-
ic stability, basic social order and key technological R&D capa-
bility in connection with national security. More specifically, the
NSR Committee will assess the transaction’s impact on: 
(i) national defence and security, including its impact on the
production capacity of defence-related domestic products,
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capacity of provision of defence-related domestic services, and
equipment and facilities that are required for national defence; 
(ii) national economic stability;
(iii) the basic order of life in society; and 
(iv) research and development capabilities related to key tech-
nologies associated with national security.87
While China’s emerging NSR procedures bear some resem-
blance to the CFIUS process, there are significant differences as
well. Overall, both have the same basic goal to review foreign
investments’ implications on national security. As Plotkin pre-
sented in his testimony, the list of factors are neither intended to
be an exhaustive definition of the scope of national security nor
are they treated as such in practice.88 The statutory inclusion
indicated by the above ‘national economic stability’ is broad and
hints at economic, rather than national security.89
The NSR system has been tainted by concerns about what
China calls ‘economic security’, which could provoke protec-
tionism when applied by the AMEAs.
2. The NSR Notice 
China’s State Council adopts an interdepartmental national
security review system for foreign M&As. For better co-ordina-
tion and efficiency, China’s State Council issued the ‘Notice on
Establishment of a Security Review System for the Merger and
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors’
(hereinafter referred to as NSR Notice) on 3 February 2011.90 It
serves as a legal basis for the M&As security review system, and
further refines China’s procedures for reviewing certain foreign
acquisitions of control over Chinese domestic enteritis. The
issuance of NSR Notice represents a significant step forward in
an effort to enhance transparency and formalise the NSR proce-
dures. The NSR Notice goes far beyond traditional national
security issues to encompass the ‘economic stability’ and ‘the
fundamental order of the society’. It leaves the terms ‘national
economic stability’ and ‘basic order of life in society’ undefined,
which is bound to establish a scope of review that is broader
than the CFIUS review.91 Furthermore, the definition of actual
control covers a broad array of foreign investment scenarios. It is
defined to include situations where any foreign investor or com-
bination of foreign investors will hold more than 50 per cent of
an enterprise’s equity, or where voting rights give a foreign
investor significant influence over shareholder meetings or
board meetings.92 It remains to be seen what would constitute
‘significant influence’, which results in a foreign investor being
deemed to have acquired actual control.93 Finally, the institu-
tional void due to the overlap may create bureaucratic delays and
impede NSR Committee’s ability to efficiently implement the
Article 31 under AML 2008.94
It seems highly challenging for foreign investors to navigate
the interplay of the NSR regime with the anti-trust process,95
particularly when inconsistent outcomes arise from the two
investigations respectively. On 1 July 2015, the National Peo-
ple’s Congress passed the People’s Republic of China National
Security Law (NSL).96 The NSL provides that certain types of
foreign investments will be subject to NSR requirements.97 On
the one hand, the NSL has consolidated the integrity of the
China’s NSR on a statutory basis, on the other hand, the broad
definition of national security embedded in the NSL could like-
ly further complicate the M&As’ review. The NSR injects
uncertainty and complexity into cross-border deals.98 It is critical
to consider the NSR’s impact on the timing and ultimate success
of the transaction.99 The longer a deal takes to approve, the more
it costs and the more variables can affect the underlying transac-
tion.100 It is to be seen whether the NSR regime will result in eco-
nomic protectionism constituting a serious obstacle for foreign
MNCs. To a greater extent, it depends upon how it will be
applied in practice given the NSR leaves substantial discretion to
the enforcement agencies.101 It is likely that the Chinese govern-
ment will issue future guidelines for enforcing the national secu-
rity review, especially in the M&As context, in light of the
broader security concerns raised in the NSL.
3. The interplay between China’s anti-monopoly clearance
and the NSR
The NSR regime formalises the concept of NSR that is embod-
ied in the existing foreign direct investment (FDI) approval
regime. The clear separation of competition reasons from
national security considerations would increase transparency
and predictability. The interactive clarification between the new
and the existing regimes is vital from a transaction management
perspective. Nevertheless, the lack of a transitional explanation
of the interrelationship between the complex governmental
agencies jeopardises NSR efficacy. It is essential to examine the
issue when a deal is to be subject to more than one review insti-
tutionally and hierarchically.
(a) FDI approval v NSR regime
The interaction between the general FDI approval procedures
and the NSR process remains uncertain. The NSR system does
not replace any of the existing controls on M&As and foreign
investment in China. It is possible that the new NSR regime will
run parallel with other laws and regulations, since it makes little
sense for a deal to go through separate reviews on national secu-
rity grounds. The first measures providing for separate FDI
review on national security grounds appeared in the M&As
Rules.102 However, on 16 February 2011, NDRC issued infor-
mal guidance indicating that foreign investors will not be
required to make a separate filing to initiate a security review;
rather, the parties may be asked to provide information neces-
sary for the security review in the course of other regulatory
reviews.103 It appears that the NSR panel will proceed on the
basis of information provided in the course of existing foreign
investment approval processes. It is unclear whether the NSR is
in effect part of the existing FDI approval framework.
March-May 2016 Commercial Law Quarterly 9
Furthermore, China’s FDI system has been progressively
decentralised in recent years.104 The local enforcement agencies
have received greater authority to approve larger projects with-
out central government involvement. The new NSR system
makes it feasible to channel certain transactions to the NSR
panel for review. It remains unclear as to whether local
approval authorities should suspend their reviews or withhold
their decisions pending the outcome of the NSR process, even
for transactions that are unlikely to trigger such concerns. It is
not clarified whether the notification for NSR should be sub-
mitted by the foreign investor directly to MOFCOM or
through its local branches.
(b) NSR vis à vis AML 2008
AML 2008 specifies an NSR procedure for acquisitions of
domestic companies by foreign investors. A foreign party could
be subject to both an economic antitrust review and an addi-
tional NSR review. An NSR is required alongside merger con-
trol review if applicable where a foreign investor acquires actu-
al control of a sensitive sector. Exceptionally, a review is
required in any event if the sector involved is military or relat-
ed sectors,105 in which there is no minimum threshold. These
transactions will be subject to review irrespective of whether
they lead to a ‘concentration’ as defined in the AML 2008.106
This approach seems to have been inspired by a decision in the
US that effectively blocked proposed Chinese investments in
mining companies that turned out to be proximate to military
facilities.107 Notably, not all transactions subject to merger
review under the AML 2008 will be subject to NSR. An M&A
is reviewable only if the foreign investor will gain ‘actual con-
trol’ of the enterprise in a key sector. And conversely, not all
transactions subject to NSR will simultaneously be subject to
merger control review. For instance, when the parties do not
meet the merger control thresholds and MOFCOM does not
sua sponte initiate an anti-trust review.108 Nevertheless, the
overlapping situation inevitably complicates the NSR where
national security concerns are involved in both antitrust review
and the NSR. It is neither clear as to how MOFCOM will treat
transactions that are notified under both the AML control and
the NSR Notice, nor certain about how to handle the risk of
inconsistent outcome.
More specifically, the M&As Rules 2006 sought to protect
the Chinese economy from any threats to its ‘national econom-
ic security’, which includes ‘key industries’ and ‘famous
brands’.109 China’s reluctance to let the well-known Chinese
brand Huiyuan pass to foreign control seems to be a perfect
example involving pure economic nationalism.110 Coca Cola–
Huiyuan shows that China’s broadly defined national security
concept has crept into AML enforcement.111 It seems that the
Chinese government plays a double role: it is both the owner of
the major players and the referee, which is detrimental to the
development of China’s market economy.112 This raises con-
cerns that protection of such SOEs from competition may be an
aspect of ‘national security’ that is to be taken into account in
the separate review.113 A subtle issue arises as to whether the aim
of ‘national security’ could be used to protect Chinese SOEs or
national champions from competition where an acquisition
does not threaten national security per se. It remains to been as
to whether Article 12 of the M&As Rules 2006 has survived the
enactment of Article 31 of the AML 2008; or whether the con-
cept of protecting ‘famous brands’ in Article 12 is now encom-
passed in the NSR Notice. The lack of guidance could result in
potential contradiction and increase the level of uncertainty.
4. Far-reaching implications
MOFCOM updated the NSR Provision which, together with
the State Council’s NSR Notice, will have a broad impact on
structuring inbound M&A transactions undertaken by foreign
investors. The procedural and substantive facets of the new NSR
regime formalise the process and add some parameters, resem-
bling analogous procedures for screening foreign investment on
national security grounds in other major jurisdictions.114 In par-
ticular, the structure reflects an analytical approach quite similar
to that adopted by the CFIUS. In response to growing concerns
of protectionism and nationalism, the NSR system marks the
path forward by establishing a firm framework for review of for-
eign M&As on national security grounds. However, the NSR
regime has been tailored to China’s particular legal and policy
environment, which inevitably renders the process opaque and
discretionary. The rules will leave great discretion in the hands
of the NSR panel. The screening may constitute a certain
impediment to FDI, which could make transactions involving
foreign acquirers more challenging. It remains uncertain
whether the system will be applied arbitrarily to deter specific
deals, or whether it will be implemented with openness and
transparency. Whether they will constitute serious obstacles for
foreign companies will depend largely upon how the rules are
applied in practice.
5. Ralls’ repercussions: 
protectionism and tit for tat
The Ralls’ decision does have a tangible and material impact on
the relations between the US and China. Politicised NSRs
result in uncertainty for businesses and can even harm diplo-
matic relations between the two economy giants. More plausi-
bly, the US approaches in dealing with the national security is
always intrinsically highly regarded by the Chinese AMEAs,
although they never openly admit for the sake of ideologism
and propaganda. Such a delicate balance used to catalyses the
institutional evolution in Chinese executive and judicial
organs, which has substantially helped to level the playing field
in various cross-border dealings. The Ralls’ decision has, to a
greater extent, shaken the trust in terms of the perceived high-
quality implementation of the NSR practice. This has also sub-
stantially worsened the interaction since the US approach
would not be appealing to the Chines AMEAs, which would
lower down the future practice and undermine the interna-
tional investment environment as a result. A critical issue arises
as to under which circumstances a blockage of foreign acquisi-
tions constitutes protectionism. Seen through the lens of the
legal architecture for review of foreign direct investment (FDI),
it depends largely upon whether there is genuine national secu-
rity rationale for blocking a proposed acquisition. It seems
vague whether national attempts to block foreign acquisitions
become a new protectionist drift that interferes with the free
flow of capital and technology across borders.115 Without a
proper resolution, this would trigger reciprocal retaliation and
undoubtedly hurt the both countries foreign investments.
The Chinese NSR regime could have a broad impact on
prospective M&As by US investors. More specifically, any
improper process of the Chinese investment will risk subject-
ing US businesses to similar sufferings when they invest in
China. This is because the scope of NSR is ambiguous and
could be an option of last resort for the Chinese authorities to
block a transaction at its discretion.116 The NSR provision
under the AML 2008 reflects the resurgence of protectionist
sentiments following the increase in foreign acquisitions of
Chinese companies.117 The NSR could be used as a shield to
protect domestic industry in the context of strategic industrial
policy,118 and to challenge foreign MNCs that are increasingly
controlling the Chinese economy. Notably, the NSR Notice
followed several high-profile rejections of Chinese firms’
acquisitions on national security grounds. For instance, the
creation of the new NSR coincided with CFIUS’s high-profile
ruling against an acquisition in the US by Huawei.119 It might
have potentially opened a door to retaliation against those per-
ceived protectionism. It remains highly datable as to whether
the NSR Notice will bring greater transparency to an opaque
process or consistent with Chinese perceptions of the CFIUS,
which serves mainly to establish a highly politicised forum for
protectionist interests. 
In essence, neither statutes nor institutions provides objec-
tive criteria to help prospective acquirers to be well informed
as to what kind of transaction is likely to be rejected on nation-
al security grounds. The NSR mechanism adds to the regula-
tory burden of foreign acquirers, as well as additional costs and
unpredictability to a proposed acquisition. Whether these
rules will constitute serious obstacles will depend upon how
the NSR regime is applied. In the interests of a level competi-
tive playing field as well as regulatory symmetry, a more trans-
parent and predictable NSR regime is highly expected in the
long term. Both the US and China will benefit greatly from
eliminating politicised treatment of the investments, which
would strengthen the reciprocal effect when one party
demands similar treatment from another when its MNCs
investing in the overseas markets.120
E. Stalemate between national security and
economic competitiveness
The CFIUS process carries with it significant amount of unpre-
dictability.121 The difficulty of balancing economic competitive-
ness and national security seems to have resulted in stalemate.122
Such an issue has been further plagued by mutual suspicion and
distrust between the two countries.123 To separate plausible
national security threats from implausible claims that a foreign
acquisition will threaten national security, it is vital to strike the
right balance between proving a predictable investment envi-
ronment and ensuring national security.124 Disconcertingly,
both CFIUS and Chinese NSR system have been considered as
a trade barrier dressed up as a national security tool, signalling
the deep untrustiness between each other. FDI and national
security need not be zero sum in combination.125 The two pillars
of the goal are not necessarily be exclusive but complementary.
1. Safeguarding national security without stifling free trade
Given the global nature of supply chains, the potential risk to
national security cannot be eliminated. It is indispensable to
develop an integral processing procedure in which risks can be
strategically mitigated.126 Screening foreign acquisitions for
potential threats to national security, CFIUS needs the flexibil-
ity to focus its scarce resources on those FDIs that create real
risks.127 Otherwise, it would compromise considerably CFIUS’s
ability to deal with those transactions that genuinely matter.
The NSR policies should be clarified so that the benchmarks
and hurdles facing Chinese investors are understood relatively
well, which will lead to a win-win outcome in achieving sustain-
able growth for the two economies. After all, more predictable
NSRs would likely attract more Chinese investment in the US,
given that China holds an estimated $3.9 trillion in foreign
reserves.128 It is essential for the NSR to be undertaken in a rea-
sonably objective manner, so as to avoid precipitating protec-
tionist and retaliatory influence.129 As Rose observed:
‘Clarification would help inoculate CFIUS against claims
that its decisions are susceptible to political manipulation, and
that increased frictions for certain deals, particularly from polit-
ical and economic rivals, are not “by design”.’130
More disclosure of the justifications in Ralls for the divesture
order would make CFIUS reviews more predictable and provide
foreign investors with a better sense of the types of investments
that are likely to create national security concerns.131
2. Compliance with CFIUS procedures: making efficient use
of voluntary filing 
The resort to judicial recourse ex poste will necessarily increase
uncertainty for all parties in a transaction.132 However, the use
of appropriated tailored CFIUS mitigation procedure can min-
imise the side effect. The current voluntary notification system
allows the parties to know CFIUS’s decision with relative cer-
tainty prior to closing the transaction. The main benefit is that
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company can take advantage of a regulatory ‘safe harbour’ that
protects it from further scrutiny or executive action.133 This
enables the parties to avoid substantial damage in the bud.
Moreover, the system of confidentiality enables parties to avoid
negative publicity typically associated with a CFIUS investiga-
tion. If the parties intend to sidestep such a procedure,134
CFIUS may initiate review sua sponte at any time and impose
measures to mitigate security risk, including possible divestiture
following a completed acquisition.135 As such, transactions that
are not voluntarily filed and are later reviewed begin at a dis-
tinct disadvantage.136 Acquisitions that sidestep CFIUS review
proceeded at Ralls’s peril, as was clearly demonstrated by the
President’s decision in 2012 to unwind the Ralls’ acquisition.137
Had it filed a notice and had CFIUS cleared it, the deal would
have been insulated from subsequent rigorous review. It would
be helpful to engage in informal pre-notification consultation
with CFIUS to discuss the transaction, filing documentation
and possible remedies. Otherwise, a proposed transaction
would remain indefinitely subject to divestment or other
action. It would be prudent to voluntarily seek CFIUS review
when there appears to be even a remote possibility of national
security concerns,138 which not only builds credibility with
CFIUS, but also helps mitigate potential risks arising from the
NSR.139 Ralls should have taken as broad as possible a view of
what the CFIUS might deem to be of national security concern
so as to avoid potential judicial deadlock. Even were that not
possible, Ralls might have avoided the costs and adverse press of
an acquisition and forced divestiture.
3. Is there a genuinely well-justified ground?
As a common practice, legitimate competitive and national
security concerns need to be addressed.140 Under the world’s
prominent international trade regimes, a nation has the right to
deny foreign investment in areas of the economy deemed inte-
gral to its national security interests.141 Certain prospective
acquisitions of US assets present legitimate security risks that
may warrant intervention.142 A subtle issue remains uncertain
whether the process is completely apolitical and immune from
insider manoeuvring.143 Although the CFIUS regulations specif-
ically disavow economic protectionism and reiterate US govern-
ment policy to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI), an
intrusive CFIUS would be an unintended protectionist barrier,
and also risk undermining the US’s goal of greater investment
access to foreign market.144 The US has had adequate control in
place to review and block those prospective M&As with nation-
al security risks. The rigorous assessment do deter those inward
acquisition even with any potential threat to national security
from entering into the US market. Such sophisticated institu-
tional and regulatory mechanism have been successful in balanc-
ing the need for foreign investment against the threat of nation-
al security.145 In no way can Chinese M&As be said to be com-
promising the national security.146
Ideally, to mitigate the issue of stalemate depends upon the
extent to which the regulatory can enhance transparency and
improve external perceptions. Paradoxically, the requirement of
transparency contradicts the legal mandate of the non-disclo-
sure of the assessment methods and criteria by the intelligence
agencies on behalf of CFIUS. Given the absence of well-
informed criteria in the CFIUS legal regime, it is hard to evalu-
ate the extent to which the Ralls case will change the trans-
parency of CFIUS assessments. Without such kind of details
available, it is infeasible to undertake an objective evaluation of
legitimacy and justification of the CFIUS’s approaches. In this
vein, hardly will Chinese objectives be realised for more pre-
dictable and transparent treatment. It seems a long way to go
from treating all investors in a fair and equitable manner under
the law. The conflict on the national security ground would
have to be addressed through a bilateral investment treaty
between the US and China.147 The fact that China has more
restrictions on foreign investment than its counterpart would
play a leverage role in resolving the chronic problem haunting
the both jurisdictions. 
Conclusion
Given the global nature of supply chains and M&As, there will
be inevitably prospect of damaging conflict between the com-
mercial interests and the national security, hence the increase
government scrutiny of cross-border acquisitions. The screen-
ing process represents an integral part of the existing foreign
investment approval procedures. The NSR regime could make
transactions involving foreign acquirers more challenging to
navigate, increasing the level of uncertainty in the foreign
investment approval process. The case demonstrates that the
US harboured deep concerns on national security grounds. As
a result, FINSA expands dramatically the mandate given to
CFIUS by Exon-Florio. Ralls’s failure to notify CFIUS ex ante
rendered it infeasible for the plaintiff to modify its terms
before the President’s divesture order. It should have done to
avoid the uncertainty of CFIUS interfering in the deal after
consummation. After all, rational as the Chinese investor’s
requirement is, CFIUS’s risk assessment for the Ralls transac-
tion was based on classified information that is generally not
susceptible to public disclosure. Any potential foreign acquir-
ers should seek approval of CFIUS prior to closing the deal.
Plausibly as it may be, the NSR result de facto in a politicised
process. As such protectionism and governance discriminatory
scrutiny may precipitate retaliation from each other, to the
detriment of the global economic recovery. The NSR institu-
tions need to adapt to a constantly evolving national security
landscape and evaluate each transaction on a case-by-case basis.
It will be beneficial for the world economy for the both the
CFIUS and Chinese NSR systems to feature an intricate bal-
ance in protecting national security while promoting national
economic interests.
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